


DECLARED IN LOS ANGELES

Times 4-15-30

Supreme Court Finally
Decides Long Drawn-out
Fight Over Taxation Issue



Supreme Court has finally decided the long drawn-out fight over the taxation issue of Barnes City.

The question of the status of the territory has been under way since a decision was filed in February, 1927. The case pertained to the question of whether the Barnes City area is a part of Los Angeles city or Los Angeles county.

The question of status was carried through Superior, Appellate and finally the Supreme Court in an action brought by residents who contended they reside in Los Angeles county and asked a final decision. They petitioned the high court asking that they be assessed the lower county taxes on the ground that the territory was not actually incorporated.

Barnes City came into being out of territory along Washington Boulevard where the Al G. Barnes circus had winter quarters. It was incorporated early in 1923. Some months later it was consolidated with Los Angeles by a vote of the residents. A suit followed shortly on grounds that the area never was a legally incorporated city and the action of its residents void.

During the hearing the status of the area has moved from city to county and back again. Tax for the district was November 1 will be based on the decision of the Supreme Court, according to all authorities.

WARRANT TO BE LOCATED! DECISION IMPERS L. A. CITY STATUS

Journal - 10-4-30

(Legal News Service)
Well, Barnes City is a part of the City of Los Angeles.

That is the apparent effect of a Supreme Court decision, entered in a minute order just received by its local office, in which the petition of George A. Bray for a writ of mandate against County Auditor Payne is denied. The opinion will be filed later.

Bray, who owns property in the Barnes City area, asked that Payne be compelled to levy a county road tax and county library tax against such property. He was represented by Attorney C. A. Lindeman, who said yesterday he will ask for rehearing in the matter.

Opposition to Bray's petition was handled by the City of Los Angeles and by County Counsel Everett W. Mattoon and Deputy Claude H. McFadden, following out a county counsel opinion that Barnes City is a part of Los Angeles City. Bray argued that the former little circus town is now unincorporated county territory.

Behind Bray's action lay two definite factors, according to Attorney Lindeman. One was that Barnes City adjoins the Venice oil fields and the residents did not want to go through the difficulties encountered by Venice residents in securing oil drilling permits from the L. A. City Council and Planning Commission.

The other factor was the matter of taxation. The county tax rate is 25 cents on the hundred dollars and the Los Angeles City tax rate is \$1.14 on the hundred dollars. The added burden of the Los Angeles City tax rate on the estimated value of the several millions of dollars worth of Barnes City property can readily be seen.

There was a further item. On Barnes City being held a part of Los Angeles City it must assume a \$250,000 bonded indebtedness that existed before the consolidation with Los Angeles City, according to Attorney Lindeman.

The question of what is Barnes City? has been presented in various forms since 1927. It began when the State Attorney General brought a quo warranto action at the instigation of Bray.

Bray contended Barnes City was illegally incorporated and secured a Superior Court default judgment holding it to be unincorporated county territory.

The City of Los Angeles then came in with a motion to vacate the default, which was granted, and the State took

an appeal to the District Court of Appeal. The Appellate Court reversed the order vacating the default.

This apparently left Barnes City unincorporated county territory and the City of Los Angeles took a petition to the Supreme Court for a review, on the ground that the Appellate decision was not understandable. The petition was denied without comment.

More recently the Los Angeles County Counsel, after a thorough analysis of all factors, was of the opinion that a consolidation proceedings, voted Sept. 14, 1926, to add Barnes City to the City of Los Angeles had been effective despite Bray's attempt to declare the town county territory. Bray's attempt was begun before the consolidation was voted. The county counsel held the view that there had been a de facto consolidation.

ITEMIZED HISTORY

An itemized history of the high lights in the Barnes City controversy is as follows:

1. Barnes City incorporated February 13, 1923.
2. Consolidated with City of L. A. at election Sept. 14, 1926.
3. Proceedings to dissolve and declare Barnes City part of County, default judgment so declaring, Aug. 9, 1927.
4. Default set aside Nov. 9, 1927, and state appeals.
5. Order vacating default reversed by District Court of Appeal (merits of default judgment not passed, this apparently left Barnes City as a part of the county).
6. City of L. A. asks Supreme Court for review on grounds Supreme Court of Appeal decision not understandable.
7. Review denied by Supreme Court without comment.
8. Barnes City held to be a part of City of Los Angeles by county counsel opinion, August, 1930 (all factors, including Appellate Court opinion, were considered).
9. Barnes City contended part of county by property owners answer to street condemnation suits filed by City of L. A. (answer filed Sept. 1, 1930 in Superior Court).
10. Barnes City now held part of L. A. City by Supreme Court.

BARNES CITY CASE SUBMITTED, BY SUPREME CT.

Journal - 9-30-30

The Supreme Court has submitted for decision the case involving the question whether Barnes City is a part of the City of Los Angeles or merely unincorporated county territory.

An early ruling is expected as the chief justice during the hearing of the matter on Sept. 15, at Los Angeles, commented that unless it is decided soon it will not be of much service on the question of whether L. A. city or L. A. county is to levy taxes in the Barnes City area.

The case was brought by George A. Bray, a property owner in the district, who asks a mandate to compel the county auditor to levy a county road tax and county library tax against his holdings. The City of Los Angeles intervened in the matter on its own behalf.

According to C. A. Lindeman, attorney for Bray, property owners in the Barnes City district wish to refrain from consolidation with L. A. City because of the difficulty that might be encountered in securing oil drilling permits from the city council and planning commission, and also because the county tax rate is \$1.34 per hundred dollars lower than that of the city, the city rate being \$1.59 and the county rate being 25 cents.

Barnes City voted to consolidate with L. A. City on Sept. 14, 1926, but the original incorporation was thereafter contested by quo warranto proceedings brought by Bray. Despite an appellate court decision in that action, there is still much controversy over the question of the town's proper status. The Supreme Court decision is expected to clarify the matter.

Barnes City Again Cuts Loose; Its In County Once More

Barnes City is reported back in the arms of the city of Los Angeles since the recent findings of County Counsel Mattoon. The property owners thereof, in protesting certain Los Angeles city assessments, disclaim the city's jurisdiction.

The city of Barnes, more or less contiguous to the city of Los Angeles, lies along Washington Boulevard between Culver City and Venice. It is where Barnes Circus formerly wintered.

Some say it was incorporated in 1926 and shortly afterward consolidated with Los Angeles city. Others say it was not incorporated and could not have been taken into the city of Los Angeles except by the annexation law and that this law was not invoked.

The argument has been in the Superior Court, and the District Court of Appeals, and the California Supreme Court, and then County Counsel Mattoon tried to settle it after all others quite evidently failed. He did have it all settled, and then Barnes City kicked loose again.

Quo warranto proceedings brought by George Bray are now pending against Barnes City and the city of Los Angeles, following recent efforts by bonding companies to collect from somebody.

BARNES CITY TAX PLEA IN HIGH COURT

(Times 9-6-30)

Hundreds of Property
Owners Ask That Area be
Declared Purely Rural

SAN FRANCISCO, Sept. 5. (AP)—Several hundred property owners of the so-called Barnes City area of Los Angeles today sought an order from the State Supreme Court that, if issued, would permit them to pay the comparatively low county taxes instead of the higher tax imposed on property in incorporated areas. The property owners were represented by their spokesman, George H. Bray.

Bray and the other property owners contend the land is unincorporated, while the County Auditor points out the area was made a part of the city of Los Angeles, April 11, 1927. Later, however, the incorporation proceedings were declared void and succeeding litigation so snarled the status of the district that the residents are not quite sure whether they are urban or rural dwellers.

Bray asked a speedy decision, because taxes are due November 1 and further litigation is probable unless the status of the district is settled.

1. Barnes City Incorporated February 13, 1926.
2. Consolidated with City of L. A. at election Sept. 14, 1926.
3. Proceedings to dissolve and declare Barnes City part of County, default judgment so declaring, Aug. 9, 1927.
4. Default set aside Nov. 9, 1927 and State appeals.
5. Order vacating default reversed by District Court of Appeal (merits of default judgment not involved—this apparently left Barnes City as a part of the county).
6. Attorney General asks Supreme Court for review on ground District Court of Appeal decision not understandable.
7. Review denied by Supreme Court without comment.
8. Barnes City held de facto a part of City of Los Angeles by county counsel opinion, August, 1930 (all factors, including Appellate Court opinion, were considered).
9. Barnes City contended part of county by property owners in answer to street foreclosure suits filed by City of L. A. (answer filed Sept. 4, 1930 in Superior Court).
10. Is Barnes City part of county or part of City of L. A., question submitted to Supreme Court in new action by Bray, to be passed on by court next Monday, Sept. 8 at San Francisco.

STATE INVOLVED IN CASE

Originally the State was involved thru a quo warranto action brought by Geo. A. Bray, the same person who is petitioner in the case now before the Supreme Court.

Bray contended Barnes City was illegally incorporated and secured the Superior Court default judgment holding it to be unincorporated county territory. The Superior Court then vacated this default and the State took the appeal to the Appellate Court. The appellate court reversed the order vacating the default.

This apparently left Barnes City unincorporated county territory but the county counsel, after a thorough analysis of all factors, was of the opinion that the consolidation proceedings to add Barnes City to the City of Los Angeles had actually taken effect and that the little town had become de facto a part of the city.

Acting under this interpretation the county auditor has refused to levy a tax for county road and library purposes against Bray's property and Bray's petition to the Supreme Court is the result. He is represented by Attorney C. A. Lindeman.

OPNIN

SEPTEMBER 6, 1930 *(L.A. News)* QUERY ON BARNES CITY AGAIN UP TO SUPREME COURT

Asks Writ of Mandate Against County Auditor; Court Acts Monday

The State Supreme Court will be asked Monday in a new and independent action to decide whether Barnes City is a part of Los Angeles County or a part of the City of Los Angeles.

The action is a petition for writ of mandate by George A. Bray, a property owner in the Barnes City district, who would compel County Auditor H. A. Payne to levy a county road tax and county library tax against his property. This the auditor has refused to do on the ground that Barnes City is a part of the City of Los Angeles.

Thus once again is presented the ever-recurring legal question: What is Barnes City? The problem has confronted the courts, numerous lawyers, taxpayers, the county counsel and newspaper reporters for a long time now. A lot of people wish the Supreme Court would decide.

Of course legal questions are harder than just plain ordinary questions, but even in a legal sense the status of Barnes City gets all wound up. And that's hard on newspaper reporters. One press room has been in the habit of holding regular debates on the question. Resolved, What is Barnes City?

Seriously now, the Supreme Court really should decide the status of the one-time circus town, located just beyond Culver City. Here are some of the legal steps in its history:

30 days

*Rehearing denied
11-13-30 Supreme Ct. Judgment final (Part of L.A. City)*

Barnes City

C O P Y

Los Angeles, California,
August 1, 1930

Mr. J. E. Rockhold
County Surveyor
Hall of Records

Dear Sir:

In your communication of July 11, 1930, you inquired as to the present status of the territory lying within what was formerly known as the City of Barnes City and, referring to the recent decision of the district court of appeal in the case of *People v. City of Barnes City*, 62 C.A.D. 184, you requested our opinion as to whether this territory should now be carried on the records as unincorporated territory.

For the reasons hereinafter set forth, it is the opinion of this office that the territory above referred to is now a part of the incorporated territory of the City of Los Angeles, and, for this reason, should not be carried on the records as unincorporated territory.

We believe that before the effect of the decision in the district court of appeal and the present status of this territory can be determined, the facts should be adequately stated in their chronological order, and an analysis of the decision made.

On October 5, 1925, a petition for the proposed incorporation of a city to be known as Barnes City was presented to the board of supervisors. Proceedings were thereafter had thereon, and, on February 13, 1926, a certificate certifying to the incorporation proceedings was filed in the office of the secretary of state.

During the latter part of 1926, proceedings were instituted for the consolidation of the City of Barnes City with the City of Los Angeles, the question was submitted to a vote of the people of the former city at an election held therein on September 14, 1926, followed by the adoption on November 17, 1926, of an ordinance by the council of the City of Los Angeles (Ordinance No. 56497) (New Series), approving such consolidation. The certificate setting forth the consolidation proceedings was not filed with the secretary of state, however, until April 11, 1927, which date was subsequent to the commencement of the quo warranto proceedings hereinafter referred to.

On February 14, 1927, a complaint in a quo warranto proceeding was filed by the attorney general in which complaint, stated in the opinion of the appellate court, the court was to adjudge:

that the proceedings purporting to incorporate the City of Barnes City are illegal and void;

that the defendant be ousted and excluded from all municipal corporate rights, privileges and franchises over the described territory; and

3. that said territory be adjudged to be unincorporated territory of the County of Los Angeles."

The time within which the defendant in the quo warranto proceeding must file its answer had been extended from time to time, and such time having expired, and no answer having been filed, defendants default was entered on May 7, 1927, (about 26 days after the consummation of the consolidation proceedings) followed, on August 9 1927, by the entry of a default judgment in favor of the plaintiff in accordance with the prayer of the complaint as hereinbefore set forth.

Two days after the entry of the default judgment, to-wit, on August 11, 1927, the City of Los Angeles made what purported to be a special appearance in the case and gave notice of two motions to be made on August 18, as follows:

One motion was for an order vacating the default and setting aside the judgment, upon the ground that the default and the judgment were attempted to be taken against a defendant which by operation of law had prior thereto been wholly dissolved and disincorporated (by virtue of the consolidation proceedings), and that by reason thereof the court was without jurisdiction to entertain or pass upon any of the matters set forth in the complaint; and upon the further ground that the judgment as entered directly affects lawfully incorporated territory of the City of Los Angeles, over which the city is and for a long time has been exercising municipal control and jurisdiction.

The other motion asked that the action be dismissed upon the ground that by virtue of consolidation proceedings the defendant City of Barnes City on the 11th day of April, 1927, became dissolved, disincorporated and non-existent; that the matter presented in the action had become moot; that there has not been, since April 11, 1927, any defendant against whom a default or judgment could be rendered and that the court is without jurisdiction to further entertain said proceeding.

On November 4, 1927, the plaintiff gave notice of motion, to be made on November 10, 1927, for leave to substitute the City of Los Angeles as party defendant and for leave to file a supplemental and amended complaint.

On November 9, 1927, the trial court made an order which recited the fact that by the judgment it appeared that by said judgment it was decreed that the territory formerly within the limits of defendant city was unincorporated territory; and that it further appeared that said default judgment was based upon a misapprehension of facts and that said adjudication of the status of the territory was not within the issued tendered by the complaint and was not a matter that could have been judicially determined in this proceeding, and that by reason thereof said judgment is so far as it attempted to adjudicate, determine and decree the status of the territory was void and in excess of jurisdiction, whereupon the court made the following order:

"* * * Upon the motion of the above entitled court, it is hereby ordered and decreed that the said judgment be vacated and set aside as void and in excess of jurisdiction, and the same be accordingly declared null and of no effect."

By order of December 30, 1927, the court denied plaintiff's motion for leave to file an amended complaint.

By order of January 12, 1928, the court ordered that the default be set aside and the action dismissed.

On behalf of the plaintiff the attorney general appealed from the order vacating the judgment and from the order denying plaintiff's motion for leave to file an amended and supplemental complaint and to substitute parties defendant, and from the judgment dismissing the action. No appeal from the default judgment was taken by the defendant Barnes City nor by its purported successor in interest, the City of Los Angeles.

In passing upon the various matters involved, the appellate court held that the default was properly entered on May 7th, notwithstanding that the proceeding for consolidation with the City of Los Angeles had been completed on the 11th day of April, 1927, and that as no appeal was taken from the judgment within sixty days from its entry, and there being no motion for new trial, the judgment on October 8, 1927, became final.

This ruling, was based upon the conclusion that by virtue of the provisions of Section 10 of the act under which the consolidation proceedings were conducted, it is provided that in the event of consolidation of municipal corporations under the act, any action brought by or against one of the consolidated corporations prior to the consolidation shall not be affected thereby; but that all such proceedings shall be continued and concluded, by final judgment or otherwise, in all respects the same as if such consolidation had not been effected. In this relation, the court said:

"* * * It follows that upon April 11, 1927, the City of Los Angeles, in taking over the City of Barnes City as a part of itself, became subject to the perils of the pending litigation against said city, and to all summonses or notices to which the original defendant was at the time bound to respond. Plaintiff was not bound to serve a new summons. * * *"

The appellate court also held that the superior court did not err in making its order of December 30, 1927, whereby it denied plaintiff's motion for leave to file an amended and supplemental complaint, and for leave to substitute the City of Los Angeles as a defendant in the action, and that, "By the same token it follows that the judgment of dismissal of the action was erroneous."

The fact that the proceedings for the consolidation of the territory with the City of Los Angeles were actually concluded and the certificate therein filed with the secretary of state, has, in our opinion, an important bearing upon the question as to the present status of the territory. We believe this to be particularly so in view of the fact that said proceedings were instituted prior to the commencement of the quo warranto action attacking the original incorporation, and said certificate was so filed prior to the entry of the judgment therein.

The law recognizes that although a municipal corporation may not be a legal corporation, it may still exist as a corporation in fact, at least until its existence is attacked by the state; as when there is a defect in the proceedings of incorporation. (1 McQuillin 2nd ed. 474; *Coe v. City of Los Angeles*, 42 Cal. App. 479.)

The courts of this state have held that de facto municipal corporation may legally perform every act which the same entity could perform were it a corporation de jure. Its existence and acts are valid against all the world, even against the state, except in direct proceedings by the state to arrest its usurpation of power. (*People v. La Roe*, 67 Cal. 526.) Thus, it has been held that acts of a de facto corporation in the exercise of eminent domain are valid, (4 McQuillin, 2nd ed. 361) and that municipal corporations de facto which issue bonds cannot offer as a defense against the bonds the ground that the municipality was not regularly organized. (*Riley v. Garfield Twp.*, 58 Kan. 299, 49 Pac. 85; *Shapleigh v. San Angelo*, 167 U. S. 646, 651, 17 Sup. Ct. 957, 42 L. ed. 310; *Uvalde v. Spier*, 91 Fed. 594, 33 C.C.A. 501.)

We have no doubt that at the time the consolidation proceedings were instituted the purported City of Barnes City was a de facto municipal corporation. In this connection, it will again be noted that at the time of the filing of the petition and of the holding of the consolidation election in Barnes City on September 14, 1926, and the adoption of the Los Angeles ordinance approving the consolidation, the quo warranto proceeding attacking its original incorporation had not been commenced. It should also be borne in mind that the certificate of consolidation was filed with the secretary of state on April 11, 1927, while the default of the City of Barnes City was not entered until May 7, 1927, and the judgment was not entered until August 9, 1927, such judgment becoming final sixty days thereafter.

From this it will appear that, at the time the consolidation proceedings were instituted and all but completed, no attack upon the original incorporation proceedings had been commenced; also that at the time the default judgment became final, the consolidation proceedings had been completed and the certificate thereof had been on file in the office of the secretary of state for a period of approximately seven months.

Section 4 of the consolidation act of 1913 (Stats. 1913, p. 577), as amended in 1917, under which the proceedings for consolidation were had, in referring to the filing of the certificate provides, in part, as follows:

" * * * Upon the filing of said document in the office of the secretary of state, such consolidation shall be deemed to be complete and such municipal corporations shall be deemed to be consolidated and the one of such municipal corporations not having the greatest population shall be deemed to be and shall be, annexed and joined to and merged into the one of said municipal corporation having the greatest population."

Having reached the conclusion that at all stages of the consolidation proceedings the purported City of Barnes City was a de facto corporation, we believe that it necessarily follows that the attempted consolidation of the two cities amounted to what might be termed a "de facto consolidation." In other words, that upon the consummation of such proceedings the City of Los Angeles became a de facto corporation as to the territory formerly known as Barnes City.

The fact is not disputed that the City of Los Angeles has at all times since the date of the filing of the certificate in the consolidation proceedings on April 11, 1927, assumed and exercised complete jurisdiction over the territory involved, levying and collecting taxes, furnishing police and fire protection, health supervision, enforcement of its ordinances, and otherwise exercising full jurisdiction over the territory in question.

We believe our conclusion as to the de facto consolidation is inescapable unless it must be held that that portion of the default judgment in the quo warranto proceeding which decreed that the territory described was in the unincorporated territory of the county fixed the status of such territory which had, prior to the rendition of such judgment become, at least de facto, a part of the City of Los Angeles.

We have reviewed the entire proceedings in the quo warranto action and find no allegation in the petition therein referring to the consolidation proceedings; this despite the fact that such proceedings were complete at the time the action was commenced except for the filing of the certificate with the secretary of state.

In addition to this, the petition does not state any facts tending to show that the territory involved was in the unincorporated territory of the county at the date of the filing thereof, nor any facts sufficient to raise any issue thereon. In truth, such allegations would be unnecessary in an attack upon an incorporation proceeding. If, as a matter of law, the incorporation proceedings were void, it would necessarily follow, also as a matter of law, that insofar as the incorporation proceedings were involved, the territory was and always had been a part of the unincorporated territory of the county, except for the limited time when its status was that of comprising the de facto City of Barnes City.

If the portion of the prayer in the petition was designed to serve as an attack on the consolidation proceedings, we believe it was wholly ineffectual for such purpose.

The action was commenced prior to the completion of the attempted consolidation, hence was premature. Furthermore, the quo warranto petition did not contain any reference to the consolidation proceedings. It constituted an attack exclusively upon the original incorporation proceedings.

An additional ground for concluding that the portion referred to of the prayer was ineffectual, and the corresponding portion of the judgment a nullity, is that the code, in providing for actions to test the validity of incorporation proceedings, does not authorize an adjudication upon that phase of the question. Section 803 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended in 1907, provides, in part, as follows:

"803. An action may be brought by the attorney general, in the name of the people of this state, upon his own information, or upon complaint of a private party, * * * against any corporation, either de jure or de facto, which usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises any franchise, within this state. * * *"

From the above quoted section it will appear that the only issue authorized to be placed before the court is as to whether there has been an usurpation, or an intrusion, or an unlawful holding or exercising of a franchise.

If there was no authority for an adjudication upon the status of the territory within the boundaries of the de facto corporation, and if such status was not within the issues of the case, then, in our opinion, the court did not have any jurisdiction to render a judgment thereon.

If the prayer of the petition had asked that this territory be adjudicated to be a part of the incorporated territory of a far distant city and the default judgment had been entered in accordance with the prayer, clearly that portion of the judgment would be void and would be disregarded. As we view the situation, the judgment in the case decided may be viewed in the same light. As was said by our supreme court, in the case of Baar v. Smith, 201 Cal. 87:

"* * * So much of a judgment that exceeds the issues as thus defined and determines issues not tried or involved is coram non iudice and void."

If, in the action, it is adjudged that there has been an usurpation of a franchise, the practical result would be an ousting therefrom and the status of the territory involved would incidentally revert back to its former status, subject to any change which may have occurred in the meantime.

In the instant matter, we believe that a change did occur in the meantime, to-wit, a consolidation, de facto at least, with the City of Los Angeles. No attack was made by the state upon this proceeding, and the three month period within which such attack may be made having expired, we

opinion of this office that at the time of the purported consolidation of the City of Barnes City with the City of Los Angeles the former was a municipal corporation de facto; that the quo warranto action against said former city did not involve the purported consolidation proceedings; that there was a de facto consolidation and that the territory of the former became a part of the latter city as a de facto corporation; that the portion of the default judgment purporting to adjudge the territory of the former city to be part of the unincorporated territory of the County of Los Angeles is void; that the territory in question is not a part of the incorporated territory of the City of Los Angeles, at least as a de facto corporation with relation thereto; and that said territory should not be carried on the records as unincorporated territory.

Respectfully submitted,

EVERETT W. MATTON, County Counsel

By Claude H. McFadden, (Signed)
Deputy County Counsel.

CHM:DS

Copy:LW

Barnes City

July 11, 1930

Mr. A. N. Mattoon
County Counsel
Hall of Records
Los Angeles

Dear Sir:

I enclose a clipping which refers to the status of the territory known as the Barnes City Consolidation with Los Angeles and ask that you advise me if said territory should not be carried on the records as unincorporated.

If unincorporated, the territory should be taken out of Los Angeles Township. It could be annexed to Venice Township and absorb Chavez and Talamantes Townships.

The territory has been carried in Los Angeles City School District. It formerly included portions of La Ballona and Playa Del Rey School districts, which portions were annexed to Los Angeles School District by reason of the consolidation. Thereafter the remaining portions of La Ballona and Playa Del Rey School districts were annexed to Los Angeles City School District by petition.

The question arises whether the petitions and subsequent action were sufficient to include the territory now under consideration.

The only remaining district which was affected by the consolidation was Washington Boulevard Lighting District, a portion of the funds thereof being turned over to Los Angeles City upon the consolidation, although the district had been dissolved by annexation of a portion thereof to Culver City prior to the incorporation of Barnes City.

7/11/30

Will you kindly advise me as to the status of the above districts and of any other features that might occur to you as affecting the work of this department.

The tax rate is established on the first Monday in September and if any change is to be made I should be advised some time prior to that date.

Yours truly,

J. E. STOCKHOLD
County Surveyor

HWS:RB
Enc. (1)

OFFICE OF THE BOARD OF
SUPERVISORS

February 21, 1928.

J. T. Rockhold,
County Surveyor.

Dear Sir:

An order was adopted by the
Board of Supervisors of the County of
Los Angeles on February 20th, granting
petition for the annexation of La Ballona
School District to the City of Los Angeles,
for school purposes only.

Very truly yours,

L. E. LAMPTON, Clerk

By (Signed) Mame B. Beatty

COPY

Deputy

OFFICE OF THE BOARD OF SUPERVISORS

May 24, 1927

J. E. Rockhold
County Surveyor

Dear Sir:

An order was adopted by the Board of Supervisors on May 23rd, granting petition for annexation of Playa Del Rey School District to the City of Los Angeles for school purposes only, and the County Surveyor was instructed to prepare a new description of boundaries.

Very truly yours,
L. E. LAMPTON, Clerk
By Mame B Beatty
Deputy

MBF
ML

Los Angeles, April 15, 1927.

Mr. Wm. Davidson,
Chief Mech. Engineer
L. A. County.

Attention Mr. Schonerd.

Dear Sir:

A portion of Washington Boulevard Lighting District was annexed to the City of Los Angeles, April 11, 1927, due to the "Barnes City Consolidation" with said City of Los Angeles, said district having been dissolved previously (Feb. 11, 1926) due to the "Walnut Park Annexation District" to Culver City.

The total area of Washington Boulevard Lighting District, Feb. 10, 1926 = 714.73 Acres.

The area of the portion of Washington Boulevard Lighting District included within said "Barnes City Consolidation" with the City of Los Angeles = 279.65 Acres or 39.13% of the entire district.

The area of the portion of said lighting district remaining within unincorporated county territory = 1.17 Acres or 0.16% of the entire district.

Yours truly,

RF:D

J. E. ROCKHOLD
County Surveyor

CONSOLIDATED WITH THE CITY OF LOS ANGELES APRIL 11, 1927.
INCORPORATION

By an election held February 3, 1926, a resolution by the Board of Supervisors, adopted February 8, 1926, and notice filed with the Secretary of State, February 13, 1926, the following described territory was incorporated:

All that part of the County of Los Angeles with the following described boundaries:

Beginning at the intersection of the northeasterly line of Del Rey Avenue, as shown on map of Cribb & Sinclair's Venice Annex recorded in Book 7, page 179 of Maps, records of Los Angeles County, with a line which is parallel with and 100 feet south-easterly, measured at right angles from the center line of Washington Boulevard (formerly Compton and Santa Monica Road, 60 feet wide), as shown on said map, said point of intersection being an angle point on the boundary of the proposed "Walnut Park Annexation District" to the City of Culver City as said district is described in Resolution No. 770 of the Board of Trustees of said City of Culver City and filed with the City Clerk of said City; thence northeasterly along the boundary of said district and along said parallel line to the northeasterly line of Redwood Avenue (formerly Santa Monica Avenue), as shown on map of Tract No. 6735 recorded in Book 77, pages 99 & 100 of Maps, records of said county; thence southeasterly along said last mentioned northeasterly line to a line which is parallel with and 150 feet southeasterly, measured at right angles from the center line of Washington Boulevard as shown on said map of Tract No. 6735; thence northeasterly parallel with said last mentioned center line and parallel with the center line of Washington Boulevard, as shown on map of Tract No. 7147, recorded in Book 80, pages 36 & 37 of Maps, records of said county, to the most southerly corner of Lot 2, said last mentioned tract; thence southeasterly in a direct line to the most westerly corner of Lot 237, of said last mentioned tract; thence southeasterly in a direct line to the most southerly corner of Lot 265 of said last mentioned tract; thence southeasterly along the northeasterly line of Moore Street (formerly Burbank Avenue), as shown on map of Tract No. 7727 recorded in Book 84, page 42 of Maps, records of said county, to the most southerly corner of lot 99 of said last mentioned tract; thence southeasterly in a direct line to the most westerly corner of Lot 118 of Tract No. 7728 as shown on map recorded in Book 85, pages 49 & 50 of Maps, records of said county; thence southeasterly in a direct line to the most southerly corner of Lot 135 of said last mentioned tract; thence northeasterly in a direct line to the most southerly corner of Lot 124 of Tract No. 7135 as shown on map recorded in Book 76, pages 88 & 89 of Maps, records of said county; thence northwesterly in a direct line to the most southerly corner of Lot 72 of said last mentioned tract; thence northerly in a direct line through the northeasterly corner

of Lot 21 of said last mentioned tract, to a line which is parallel with and 150 feet southerly measured at right angles from the center line of Washington Boulevard as shown on said last mentioned map; thence easterly along said last mentioned parallel line and easterly along a line which is parallel with and 150 feet southerly measured at right angles from the center line of Washington Boulevard as shown on map of Tract No. 7358 recorded in Book 84, pages 25 to 28 of Maps, records of said county, and easterly and northeasterly along a line which is parallel with and 150 feet southerly measured at right angles from the center line of Washington Boulevard (formerly Washington Street), as shown on map of Culver Gardens recorded in Book 40, page 56 of Maps, records of said county, and as shown on map of Tract No. 1971 recorded in Book 22, page 185 of Maps, records of said county, to a line which is parallel with and 150 feet southeasterly, measured at right angles from the southwesterly prolongation of the center line of Washington Boulevard, as shown on map of Tract No. 7419, recorded in Book 84, pages 54 & 55 of Maps, records of said county; thence northeasterly along said last mentioned parallel line to the southwesterly line of that certain parcel of land described in a deed to Ygnacio Valdez, recorded in Book 2202, page 55 of Deeds, records of said county; thence southeasterly along said last mentioned southwesterly line, leaving the boundary of said proposed "Walnut Park Annexation District", to the most southerly corner of said last mentioned parcel of land, being a point in the southwesterly prolongation of the northwesterly line of the Pacific Electric Railway Company's right of way, as shown on map of said Tract No. 7419; thence northeasterly along said last mentioned prolongation to the most southerly corner of said last mentioned tract; thence northwesterly along the southwesterly line of McLaughlin Avenue as shown on said last mentioned map to the boundary of aforesaid proposed annexation, being a line which is parallel with and 150 feet southeasterly measured at right angles from the center line of Washington Boulevard, as shown on said last mentioned map; thence northeasterly along said last mentioned parallel line to a line which is parallel with and 150 feet southeasterly measured at right angles from the center line of Washington Boulevard (formerly Washington Street) as shown on map of Tract No. 3901, recorded in Book 42, page 55 of Maps, records of said county; thence northeasterly along said last mentioned parallel line to the southwesterly line of Tract No. 7026, as shown on map recorded in Book 79, page 42 of Maps, records of said county; thence southeasterly and northeasterly along the boundary of said last mentioned tract; to the southwesterly line of the Elenda Young Tract, as shown on map recorded in Book 54, page 43, Miscellaneous Records of said county; thence southeasterly and northeasterly along the boundary of said last mentioned tract to the most northerly corner of Tract No. 1441 as shown on map recorded in Book 20, pages 30 & 31 of Maps, records of said county; thence southeasterly, leaving the boundary of said proposed annexation, along the boundary of said last mentioned tract, and following the same in all its various courses to the most northerly corner of Lot 2 of the Leidel Tract, as shown on map recorded in Book 3858, pages 210 and 211 of Deeds, records of said county; thence southwesterly

along the boundary of said last mentioned tract and following the same in all its various courses to the most westerly corner of Lot 5 of said last mentioned tract; thence southeasterly along the northeasterly line of Lot 6, said last mentioned tract, a distance of 1024.98 feet; thence S. 38° 43' W. parallel with the southeasterly line of said last mentioned lot, to a point in the northeasterly line of Mesmer Avenue as shown on map of Tract No. 8539, recorded in Book 104, pages 53 to 55 of Maps, records of said county; thence southeasterly along said last mentioned northeasterly line, to the northeasterly prolongation of the southeasterly line of Lot 547 of said last mentioned tract; thence ~~west~~ ^{west} westerly in a direct line through the most southerly corner of Lot 364 of said last mentioned tract to the southwesterly line of said last mentioned tract; thence southeasterly along said last mentioned southwesterly line to the most southerly corner of said last mentioned tract; thence southwesterly in a direct line to the most southerly corner of Jose J. Machado 17.903725 acres as shown on map of Parts of the Rancho La Ballona recorded in Book 3, pages 204 to 209 inclusive, Miscellaneous Records of said county; thence northwesterly in a direct line to the most westerly corner of Andres Machado 17.903725 acres as shown on said map of Parts of the Rancho La Ballona; thence northeasterly along the southeasterly line of Port Road, as shown on map of Tract No. 5184 recorded in Book 92, pages 1 & 2 of Maps, records of said county to the southeasterly prolongation of the southwesterly line of Marshall Drive, as shown on said last mentioned map; thence northwesterly in a direct line to the most westerly corner of said last mentioned tract; thence southwesterly along the southwesterly prolongation of the northwesterly line of said last mentioned tract to the center line of Centinela Avenue, as shown on map of Tract No. 7428 recorded in Book 100, pages 34 & 35 of Maps, records of said county; thence northwesterly along said last mentioned center line to the northeasterly prolongation of the southeasterly line of Milton Street, as shown on said last mentioned map; thence southwesterly along said last mentioned prolongation and southeasterly line to the most southwesterly line of said last mentioned tract; thence northwesterly in a direct line through the most westerly corner of Lot 160 of said last mentioned tract to the southeasterly line of the Venice Del Rey Tract, as shown on map recorded in Book 6, page 135 of Maps, records of said county; thence southwesterly along said last mentioned southeasterly line and the southwesterly prolongation thereof to the northwesterly line of the Pacific Electric Railway Company's right of way (formerly Del Rey Div. L. A. P. R. R.) as shown on map of Tract No. 1100 recorded in Book 18, pages 66 & 67 of Maps, records of said county; thence southwesterly along said last mentioned northwesterly line to the southeasterly prolongation of the southwesterly line of Alla Road as shown on map of the Venice Del Rey Tract No. 2, recorded in Book 8, page 33 of Maps, records of said county; thence northwesterly along said last mentioned prolongation and southwesterly line to the southwesterly prolongation of the southeasterly line of Walsh Avenue as shown on map of Tract No. 7601, recorded in Book 117, pages 20 & 21 of Maps, records of said county; thence

northeasterly in a direct line through the most northerly corner of Lot 24, Block Q of said Venice Del Rey Tract No. 2, to the southeasterly prolongation of the northeasterly line of said Tract No. 7601; thence northwesterly in a direct line to the most easterly corner of said last mentioned tract; thence southwesterly in a direct line through the most southerly corner of Lot 74, said last mentioned tract to the southwesterly line of Alla Road as shown on said map of Tract No. 7601; thence northwesterly along said last mentioned southwesterly line and northwesterly along the southwesterly line of Alla Road, as shown on aforesaid Map of Tract No. 7728 to the southeasterly line of Maxella Avenue, as shown on aforesaid map of Tract No. 6735; thence southwesterly along said last mentioned southeasterly line to the most southerly corner of said last mentioned tract; being a point in the northeasterly line of Redwood Avenue, (formerly Santa Monica Avenue), as shown on map of Wright's Addition to Ocean Park, recorded in Book 5, page 174 of Maps, records of said county; thence southeasterly along said last mentioned northeasterly line to the southeasterly line of Maxella Avenue, formerly an unnamed road lying adjacent to the southeasterly line of said Wright's Addition to Ocean Park; thence southwesterly along said last mentioned southeasterly line to the southeasterly prolongation of the northeasterly line of Del Rey Avenue, as shown on said last mentioned map; thence northwesterly in a direct line to the point of beginning.

Excepting therefrom the following described parcels:

Parcel 1: Beginning at the most easterly corner of Tract No. 7829 as shown on map recorded in Book 86, pages 87 & 88 of Maps, records of said county; thence southeasterly in a direct line to the intersection of the northeasterly prolongation of the northwesterly line of Lot 50 of Tract No. 8324, as shown on map recorded in Book 112, page 43 of Maps, records of said county, with the southwesterly line of Inglewood Boulevard, as shown on said last mentioned map; thence southwesterly in a direct line to the most northerly corner of said last mentioned lot; thence southwesterly, northwesterly, southwesterly and southeasterly along the boundary of said last mentioned tract to the most northerly corner of Tract No. 7428 as shown on map recorded in Book 100, pages 34 & 35 of Maps, records of said county; thence southwesterly in a direct line to the most westerly corner of said last mentioned tract; thence northwesterly along the northeasterly line of Centinella Avenue; formerly Columbus Avenue as shown on map of Venice Del Rey Tract, recorded in Book 6, page 135 of Maps, records of said county to the southeasterly line of the Pacific Electric Railway right of way (Redondo Division), as shown on aforesaid map of Tract No. 7829; thence northeasterly along said last mentioned right of way line to the southeasterly line of said last mentioned tract; thence northeasterly in a direct line to the point of beginning.

Parcel 2: Beginning at the most northerly corner of Tract No. 8034 as shown on map recorded in Book 106, pages 49 & 50 of Maps, records of said county; thence northeasterly along the northeasterly prolongation of the center line of Russel Street, as shown on said last mentioned map, N. 31° 15' E. 151.80 feet; thence S. 52° 15' E. 347.16 ft.; th. N. 37° 45' E. 90.42; th. S. 52°

TALAMANTES

15' E. 143.88 feet; thence S. 37° 45' W. 106.92 feet; thence S. 52° 15' E. 1273.80 feet to the northwesterly line of the Leidel Tract, as shown on map recorded in Book 3858, pages 210 & 211 of Deeds, records of said county; thence southwesterly along the boundary of said last mentioned tract to the southeasterly prolongation of the northeasterly line of said Tract, No. 8034; thence northwesterly in a direct line to the point of beginning.

A-101. A-332. A-352. A-353.

Washington Blvd Lighting Dist.

2/11/26 - Dissolved - by "Walnut Park Association Dist"
to Culver City - 42.09 %

3/5/27 - "Mar Vista add" to City of L.A. - 18.62 %

4/11/27 - "Barnes City Council" - " " " - 39.13 %
(Civ. Lett. - 4/14/27)

(Unincorporated) - $\frac{0.16}{100.00}$ %

2/13/26 Barnes City Symp
Rt. Dist #4 = \$3375.83 = Road Funds
transferred to
City of Barnes City.